Categories
05. Denial Periods

Rogel v Taylor School District – 5.14

Rogel v Taylor School District
Digest no. 5.14

Section 27(i)

Cite as: Rogel v Taylor School Dist, 152 Mich App 418 (1986).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Ann Rogel, et al.
Employer: Taylor School District
Docket no.: B81 88405 87051
Date of decision: June 16, 1986

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: The employer cannot unilaterally alter the definition of the academic year set by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement merely for budgeting reasons.

FACTS: Claimants’ union and the employer negotiated a collective bargaining agreement requiring the school year to commence on September 1, 1981. Because of financial problems created by millage defeats, employer postponed the start of the school year until September 28, 1981. The employer continued the school year through June 1982 for a period equal to the time lost at the beginning of the year.

DECISION: Claimants entitled to benefits pursuant to Section 27(i)(1) and (4) when the employer unilaterally delays the start of the academic year for budgetary considerations.

RATIONALE: “Seizing on the phrase ‘as defined by the educational institution,’ the school district now argues that the 1981-1982 school year should be defined under Section 27(i)(4) as beginning on September 28. Acceptance of that argument would mean that a school district could unilaterally change the beginning and ending dates of the school year at any time without its employees being able to collect unemployment benefits. Such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of the MESA, which was intended to soften the economic burden of those who through no fault of their own, find themselves unemployed. See General Motors Corp. v Erves (On Rehearing), 399 Mich 241, 252; 249 NW2d 41 (1976); MCL 421.2; MSA 17.502. The school year was defined by contract as beginning September 1. When claimants did not start work on September 1, their period of unemployment began not in a ‘period between successive academic years,’ but rather during an academic year. The denial period did not apply.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
18. Restitution, Waiver, Fraud

Knight v Holland Hitch Co – 18.04

Knight v Holland Hitch Co
Digest no. 18.04

Section 62(a)

Cite as: Knight v Holland Hitch Co, unpublished opinion of the Ottawa Circuit Court, issued November 4, 1983 (Docket No. B77 19822 68271).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Howard V. Knight
Employer: Holland Hitch Company
Docket no.: B77 19822 68271

Date of decision: November 4, 1983

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: Where a claimant is awarded back pay by an arbitrator for a contested discharge and he is paid full back pay minus the unemployment insurance benefits he earlier received from the MESC, the employer is liable for restitution to the MESC.

FACTS: The claimant grieved his discharge. He received an arbitration award of full back pay for all lost time less unemployment compensation received.

DECISION: The employer is liable to MESC for the unemployment compensation deducted from the back pay awarded claimant.

RATIONALE: “A review of the language of the Michigan Employment Security Act makes it clear that the legislative purposes giving rise to the act did not include permitting double recovery by a claimant-employee (later determined to have been wrongfully discharged and entitled to back pay) by permitting him to retain unemployment benefits and full back pay for the same period. Neither do such legislative purposes support the enrichment of an employer who wrongfully discharges an employee, at the expense of the state fund and other employers, by permitting the employer to retain unemployment benefits deducted from back wages paid to the employee after reinstatement.

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
6/91