16. Procedures/Appeals

Liu v. R & E Automated Systems – 16.89

Liu v. R & E Automated Systems
Digest No. 16.89

Section 421.28(1)(c)

Cite as: Liu v R & E Automated Sys, unpublished order of Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission, entered October 28, 2015 (Docket No. 14-032454-244075W).

Appeal pending: Yes
Claimant: Shu Liu
Employer: R & E Automated Systems LLC
Docket no.: 14-032454-244075W
Date of decision: October 28, 2015

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HOLDING: The ALJ’s order should be set aside since the Agency’s initial determination set forth a completely theory of ineligibility than was set forth at the hearing.

FACTS: This case was brought before the Appellate Commission pursuant to the claimant’s appeal from an order denying reopening by an ALJ. The claimant requested a rehearing of the ALJ’s amended decision. The ALJ issued an order denying the reopening.

DECISION: The claimant is not ineligible for benefits. The portion of the ALJ’ s decision that found the claimant ineligible for benefits under Section 28(1)(c) of the Act is reversed.

RATIONALE: The ALJ should have allowed rehearing to at least correct the errors in the amended decision. These issues were the reason the Appellate Commission set the order aside. When the initial determination was made, the issue was framed as “Your non-citizen documentation confirming you are lawfully present in the United States expired on September 17, 2014.” At the hearing, the Agency admitted that the actual issue was that the claimant’s work visa had expired. Since this was a completely different issue than that which is set forth in the determination, the decision should be set aside. The Agency cannot set forth one explanation for ineligibility in a determination, then appear at a hearing on appeal of the determination and proceed on an alternate theory of ineligibility. A claimant cannot be expected to foresee and prepare for an issue other than that which the Agency set forth in its determination. This is contrary to basic due process. For these reasons, the Commission reversed the portion of the ALJ’s decision that found the claimant ineligible for benefits under Section 28(1)(c) of the Act. The claimant is not ineligible under Section 28(1)(c).

Digest Author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 1/6/2016

20. Miscellaneous

Henry v Ford Motor Co – 20.01

Henry v Ford Motor Co
Digest no. 20.01

Section 28(1)(c)

Cite as: Henry v Ford Motor Co, 291 Mich 535 (1939).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Lee Henry
Employer: Ford Motor Company
Docket no.:
Date of decision: December 19, 1939

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: A finding of disability for purposes of worker’s compensation does not necessarily mean a claimant is disabled and ineligible for unemployment insurance under Section 28(1)(c).

FACTS: Claimant suffered a work related injury. He filed for and received worker’s compensation. After some time he returned but could only perform favored work because of a restriction associated with the injury. Ultimately he was laid off and filed for unemployment benefits.

The employer contested the claimant’s eligibility. It asserted that because the claimant had been found disabled by the worker’s compensation board he couldn’t be fully able and available and had to be found ineligible pursuant to Section 28(1)(c) of the Employment Security Act.

DECISION: A finding that an employee is totally disabled so far as returning to pre-injury work is not necessarily inconsistent with a finding that he is able to, and is available for, work within his restrictions.

RATIONALE: An employee permanently disabled to continue the work that he was engaged in when the accident occurred may nevertheless be able to do some light work of a different nature than that in which he was previously engaged.

Digest Author:  Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 12/91