11. Leaving to Accept

Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Association – 11.03

Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Association
Digest no. 11.03

Sections 29(5), 40, 41

Cite as: Robinson v Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 123 Mich App 442 (1983).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: George Robinson
Employer: Young Men’s Christian Association
Docket no.: B76 18107 57053
Date of decision: February 24, 1983

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: Section 29(5) does not apply if a claimant leaves to accept employment with an out of state employer not subject to the jurisdiction of the MESC.

FACTS: Claimant was employed at the YMCA, but resigned to accept permanent full time employment at the YMCA in Muncie, Indiana. He was discharged by the Indiana employer. Claimant returned to Michigan and applied for unemployment compensation.

DECISION: Claimant is disqualified from benefits.

RATIONALE: “In Merren v Employment Security Commission, 3 Mich App 383 (1966) a panel of this court held that the word ’employer’ in the phrase in question referred only to Michigan employers. This interpretation was affirmed by an equally divided Supreme Court, Merren v Employment Security Commission, 380 Mich 240 (1968).” “The term employer as used in the Act does not include out of state employers.

The Court of Appeals went on to say that Section 29(5) does not impinge upon Claimant’s right to interstate travel . . . and finds without merit Claimant’s argument that this construction of the statute renders it unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Digest Author:  Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 11/90

10. Voluntary Leaving

Lyons v MESC – 10.51

Lyons v MESC
Digest no. 10.51

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Lyons v MESC, 363 Mich 201 (1961).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Charles Lyons
Employer: Chrysler Corporation
Docket no.: B57 5079 20232
Date of decision: April 26, 1961

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: Section 29(1)(a) is applicable to separations from work outside of Michigan. The finding that claimant left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to the employer was supported by the evidence.

FACTS: The claimant was laid off from one of the employer’s Michigan plants. After receiving a few weeks of unemployment benefits, he accepted work at the employer’s Indiana plant, 273 miles from home. The car he relied on broke down, the friend with whom he planned to commute quit, he did not receive expected overtime, and he learned his minor son had left home. He resigned the Indiana employment to return to Michigan. He was denied further benefits as his leaving was voluntary without good cause attributable to the employer.

DECISION: The claimant is disqualified for voluntary leaving.

RATIONALE: The application of Section 29(1)(a) to separations from work outside of Michigan is consistent with the language of that Section as well as those parts of the Act which provide for reciprocal agreements between states for one state to pay accrued benefits to an employee after he has moved to another state and become unemployed. A contrary interpretation would impose more stringent standards on employees working wholly in Michigan than those whose employment takes them outside the state.

The justices split on the question of the voluntariness of the leaving. Three justices stated the leaving was for wholly personal reasons and, as a matter of law, was voluntary and without good cause attributable to the employer. Two justices agreed with the disqualification but viewed the issue of voluntariness as one of fact which had been decided against the claimant on the basis of evidence which supported the finding. Three justices, in an opinion by Justice Edwards, concluded that, as a matter law, the leaving was involuntary. (See Laya v Cebar Construction Company, 101 Mich App 26 (1980), Digest No. 10.05. Therein, the court adopted Justice Edwards’ standard for determining the voluntariness of a separation.)

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: