Categories
10. Voluntary Leaving

Makela v Waterford School District – 10.20

Makela v Waterford School District
Digest no. 10.20

Section 29(1)(a)

Cite as: Makela v Waterford School Dist, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, issued April 9, 1980 (No. B79 01484 66562).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Eve Makela
Employer: Waterford School District
Docket no.: B79 01484 66562
Date of decision: April 9, 1980

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BOARD OF REVIEW HOLDING: Where an individual is on a layoff for lack of work, and resigns to accept work with another employer, the claimant is not disqualified for voluntary leaving.

FACTS: The claimant, a teacher aide, was laid off in June. She received reasonable assurance or reemployment in the fall. While on layoff, the claimant accepted office work with another employer, and resigned the teacher aide position.

DECISION: The claimant is not disqualified for voluntary leaving.

RATIONALE: “Prior Board decisions have consistently held that in order for the disqualification provisions of Section 29(1)(a) to apply the claimant must be actually in employment or that the employment relationship continues as in the case of a leave of absence or labor dispute. Here, the claimant was not in employment when she quit and, therefore, is not subject to the disqualification provisions of the Act. See Wright (Packard Motor Car Co), Appeal Docket No. B9-1771-9898 (1949).”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated: 11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

McCaleb v Harbor Industries, Inc – 4.10

McCaleb v Harbor Industries, Inc
Digest no. 4.10

Section 48

Cite as: McCaleb v Harbor Industries, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals of Michigan, issued September 8, 1978 (No. 77-5202).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Victor E. McCaleb, et al.
Employer: Harbor Industries, Inc.
Docket no.: B75 15530 50209
Date of decision: September 8, 1978

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COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: (1) Where contractual specification of vacation procedures includes designation of vacation periods but does not treat the allocation of vacation pay, the employer may allocate such pay as it chooses. (2) Arbitration has no role in the determination of eligibility for benefits.

FACTS: The employer allocated vacation pay to a week in which the claimants were on layoff. A subsequent arbitration decision dealt with the selection of a vacation period.

DECISION: The claimants received remuneration under Section 48 of the Act.

RATIONALE: The Court affirmed the Ottawa Circuit Court, which held: “We interpret Section 10.1 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement as dealing with the scheduling of vacations by the employer, and employee participation in selecting individual vacation periods. Nothing is said about the allocation of vacation pay to any particular period. Neither does the arbitrator’s decision reach such issue. (Properly so, because arbitration has no place in the Michigan system of administrative and judicial determination as to eligibility for statutory employment compensation benefits.) We reject appellant’s request to add contractual language by implication as being without justification, particularly in view of the statutory grant of power to the employer to allocate vacation pay as he chooses in the absence of ‘contractual specification.'”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp – 4.01

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp
Digest no. 4.01

Section 48

Cite as: Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp, 394 Mich 702 (1975).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Russell W. Brown, et al.
Employer: LTV Aerospace Corporation
Docket no.: B70 773 38400
Date of decision: September 8, 1975

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: (1) A pro-rata vacation allowance at the time of layoff is not a termination allowance and may be considered as vacation pay. (2) Where claimants are not numerous enough to require a class action, and their consolidated appeal is filed in a circuit other than Ingham, the appeal must be dismissed as to any claimant not residing in the circuit of filing.

FACTS: At the time of layoff, the claimants were paid a pro-rata share of their annual vacation pay. These payments were held to be remuneration under Section 48 of the Act. The claimants appealed to Macomb Circuit Court, where the appeal was dismissed as to claimant Boyer because he resided in Oakland County.

DECISION: (1) The pro-rata vacation pay was remuneration. (2) Boyer’s appeal was properly dismissed.

RATIONALE: (1) Analysis of the union contract ” … indicates that the agreement speaks of vacation pay to an employee regularly employed, of one ‘at the time of termination’ and one ‘terminated for lack of work and subsequently recalled’ in exactly the same way. The emphasis is all on guaranteeing vacation pay in accord with credit earned because of time worked. The system is integral and it is no different ‘at time of separation’ from either regular annual anniversary payments or payments of allowances for those terminated and then recalled.”

“The language of the statute is unambiguous, and it is clear that under [Section] 38 Boyer should have filed his appeal in either Oakland Circuit Court, the circuit court of the county in which he resided, or the Ingham Circuit Court.

Section 38 is a statutory grant of jurisdiction to certain circuit courts; if an appeal is improperly filed in the wrong court, that court has no option but to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Hickson v Chrysler Corp – 4.02

Hickson v Chrysler Corp
Digest no. 4.02

Section 48

Cite as: Hickson v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 724 (1975).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Joseph R. Hickson
Employer: Chrysler Corporation
Docket no.: B70 5047 RO 39184
Date of decision: September 8, 1975

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: Where a labor agreement provides for the allocation of vacation pay to a portion of an indefinite layoff period, the payments are remuneration and not severance pay.

FACTS: “Soon after being laid off plaintiff received 28 days vacation pay from his employer in accordance with a Chrysler-UAW contract. The 28 days pay was comprised of:

1) 17-1/2 days vacation credit accrued in 1969 which prior to the layoff plaintiff and his employer had agreed the plaintiff would take between July 6 and July 29 and

2) 10-1/2 vacation days accrued in 1970 up to the time of the layoff which normally would not have been taken until 1971.”

DECISION: The claimant’s vacation pay constitutes remuneration under Section 48 of the Act.

RATIONALE: “In this case there can be no question that the Chrysler/UAW contract provided for the designation of the period for allocation of vacation pay.”

“Receipt of ‘termination, separation, severance, or dismissal allowances, and bonuses’ suggests payment independent of and perhaps in addition to vacation payments. The payments in question were clearly ‘for a vacation or a holiday.'”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90