Categories
12. Misconduct

Hoag v. Emro Marketing – 12.141

Hoag v. Emro Marketing
Digest No. 12.141

Section 421.29(1)(b)

Cite as: Hoag v Emro Mktg, unpublished opinion of the Maycomb County Circuit Court, issued April 9, 1999 (Docket No. 98-4783-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Jeffery A. Hoag
Employer: Emro Marketing
Docket no.: 98-4783-AE
Date of decision: April 9, 1999

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HOLDING: Recurrences of negligent behavior do not per se suggest an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests and thus cannot per se establish misconduct.

FACTS: Appellant worked as an assistant manager for Emro Marketing and was discharged for cash drawer shortages. Appellant was initially determined to be not disqualified from receiving benefits. A further redetermination also found Appellant not disqualified. A hearing in front of an ALJ held the same

finding that the employer had not met its burden of proof in establishing appellant was discharged for reasons which would constitute misconduct. Further, the ALJ found that the appellant’s reporting of the shortages which allocated the blame to himself,  coupled with his signing of the respective warnings from his employer did not constitute misconduct. The Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, on appeal, found that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case. The Board concluded that if appellant did not commit theft, then he was obviously negligent. Further, the Board found misconduct was established by such reoccurrences as to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’ s duties and obligations to the employer

DECISION: The Court finds the Board acted contrary to law when it determined appellant’s recurrent negligence rose to the level of disqualifying misconduct.

RATIONALE: The court found that the Board’s decision was contrary to law in that the facts found did not constitute the legal definition of misconduct. This is because the Board’s use of res ipsa loquitur was in error. When determining if misconduct exists,  the legal question is not merely whether appellant was negligent, but whether that negligence rises to the level of disqualifying misconduct. Negligent recurrences do not per se suggest an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests, thus, they do not amount to misconduct. Here the employer bears the burden of proof in showing appellant’s recurrent negligence showed an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest.

Digest Author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/1/2016

Categories
15. Labor Disputes

Baggett v. Riverside Osteopathic Hospital – 15.37

Baggett v. Riverside Osteopathic Hospital
Digest No. 15.37

Section 421.29(8)(a)(i)

Cite as: Baggett v Riverside Osteopathic Hospital, unpublished opinion of the Wayne County Circuit Court, issued February 19, 1999 (Docket No. 98-820404-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Shelby Baggett, et al.
Employer
: Riverside Osteopathic Hospital
Docket no.: 98-820404-AE
Date of decision: February 19, 1999

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HOLDING: Claimants who were on strike had not been “permanently displaced,” and therefore a labor dispute was the cause of their unemployment, which disqualified claimants for benefits under Section 29(8)(a)(i) of the MES Act.

FACTS: Claimants went on strike May 24, 1990 and returned to work on October 19, 1990. After July 8, 1990, the employer began hiring employees who subsequently became “permanent” employees. From the date the strike began to the end of the strike, positions for the striking employees were available upon their return. Claimants were returned to their positions after the strike. During the strike, claimants applied for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review determined claimants disqualified for benefits.

DECISION: The circuit court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision, which found the claimant to be disqualified for benefits due under Section 29(8)(a)(i) of the MES Act.

RATIONALE: Section 29(8) of the MES Act reads in relevant part: “(a) An individual is disqualified from receiving benefits for a week in which the individual’s total or partial unemployment is due to either of the following: (i) A labor dispute in active progress at the place at which the individual is or was last employed, or a shutdown or start-up operation caused by that labor dispute.” The circuit court read the Michigan Supreme Court case of Plymouth Stamping v Lipshu, 436 Mich 1 (1990), to suggest that Section 29(8) means, “If there is a position open for a striking worker, he/she is ineligible for unemployment benefits.” But, if claimants were permanently displaced then the labor dispute would no longer be the cause of their unemployment, and the claimants would thus be eligible for benefits. Here, the circuit court determined that the striking employees had permanent positions to return to and and that those employees were, in fact, returned to those positions at the end of the strike. Further, these positions were available to claimants throughout the strike. Thus, the Board of Review’s conclusion that claimants were not permanently displaced was supported by substantial evidence.

Digest Author: Adam Kleven, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016

Categories
12. Misconduct

Ellison v. MESC – 12.138

Ellison v. MESC
Digest No. 12.138

Section 421.29

Cite as: In the matter of the claim of Ellison, unpublished opinion of the MESC, issued June 6, 1972 (Docket No. B71-1229-40927).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Thomas H. Ellison
Employer: Michigan Employment Security Commission
Docket no.: B71-1229-40927
Date of decision: June 6, 1972

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HOLDING: An indefinite suspension of a Claimant is equivalent to a discharge. Claimant’s disqualification for benefits should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred.

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision issued on May 1, 1972. Claimant originally appealed a February 23, 1972 holding that Claimant should be disqualified from benefits under Section 29(9) of the Act for the period from December 15, 1971 through December 31, 1971; disqualified from benefits under Section 29(1)(b) of the Act for the week ending on January 1, 1972; and subject to requalification under Section 29(3) of the Act.

DECISION: The Appeal Board affirms the February 23, 1972 holding, except the part of the decision that relates to the disqualification under Section 29(9), as well as the dates of separation and discharge. The Appeal Board modifies the decision to establish that Claimant was given an indefinite suspension for misconduct either directly or indirectly connected with the work, and then discharged on December 31, 1970. Claimant was discharged following his last day of work on December 15, 1970 and is disqualified for benefits for the week ending in December 18, 1970.

RATIONALE: When an individual is given an indefinite suspension, it is tantamount to a discharge, and the disqualification should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred. The disqualification will continue until the individual requalifies as provided under Section 29(3) of the Act.

Digest Author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 1/7/2016