Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Barbee v. J.C. Penney – 16.73

Barbee v. J.C. Penney
Digest No. 16.73

Section 421.29(b), 421.33, 421.34, 421.38

Cite as: Barbee v JC Penney Corp, Inc, Unpublished Opinion of the Circuit Court for the County of Oakland, Issued January 26, 2006 (Docket No. 177083W).

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Appeal Pending: No
Claimant: Della M. Barbee
Employer: J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc.
Tribunal: Circuit Court for the County of Oakland
Date of Decision: January 26, 2006

HOLDING: The State of Michigan Employment Security Board of Review’s (“Board”) lacks jurisdiction to review untimely appeals.

FACTS: Claimant was employed by J.C. Penney as a Customer Service Associate until she was discharged for misconduct. Her alleged misconduct included obtaining fraudulent refunds, discount abuse, and unauthorized price adjustments. The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) disqualified the claimant from benefits due to her misconduct under MCL 421.29(b).

Claimant appealed the ALJ’s decision to the State of Michigan Employment Security Board of Review (“Board”). The deadline to appeal was September 24, 2004, but claimant did not file her appeal until October 6, 2004. Pursuant to MCL 421.33, the Board dismissed the late appeal due to lack of jurisdiction.

Claimant did not seek rehearing or to reopen the case with the Board for good cause but instead, appealed to the Circuit Court (“Court”) for de novo review of the Board’s (1) arbitrary Appeal deadline and (2) the underlying determination in finding the Plaintiff guilty of misconduct.

DECISION: The Board’s deadlines cannot be challenged as arbitrary because they were set by the legislature and codified as MCL 421.33(2) and MCL 421.34. Additionally, the Circuit Court cannot de novo review claimant’s underlying determination because she appealed the Board’s decision. Finally, the Board’s order dismissing claimant’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction was proper.

RATIONALE: The Circuit Court ruled that the appeal deadlines were not arbitrary because they were established by the legislature through MCL 421.33(2) and MCL 421.34.

The Court also denied claimant’s appeal for de novo review of her underlying determination as guilty of misconduct. The Court noted that a claimant can appeal a referee’s (ALJ’s) decision to the Circuit Court directly under MCL 421.38(2). However, because the claimant appealed the Board’s decision and said decision did not include a review of claimant’s determination as guilty of misconduct, the Circuit Court lacks authority to de novo review the claimant’s guilty determination.

The Circuit Court reviewed the whole record to determine if claimant’s appeal was untimely. Pursuant to MCL 421.38(1), the standard for finding an appeal untimely is support by competent, material, and substantial evidence. After finding that the appeal was untimely under the standard, the Court affirmed the Board’s decision dismissing claimant’s untimely appeal for lack of jurisdiction under MCL 421.33.

Digest Author: Sean Higgins, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016

Categories
13. Refusal of Work

UIA v. JDM & Associates v. Yordy – 13.28

UIA v. JDM & Associates v Yordy
Digest No. 13.28

Section 421.29(1)(e)

Cite as: JDM & Assoc v Yordy, Muskegon County Circuit Court, issued August 30, 2005 (Docket No. 05-43773-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Sara B. Yordy
Employer: JDM & Associates
Docket no.: 176914W
Date of decision: August 30, 2005

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HOLDING: The Board’s decision to grant Yordy unemployment benefits was contrary to law. Yordy was not eligible for unemployment benefits because she failed without good cause to accept alternative suitable work offered to her by JDM.

FACTS: JDM & Associates had placed Yordy as an employee doing industrial work  at Hillite International from August 2002 to June 2003. When that job ended, JDM offered her other full-time employment doing industrial work at Whitehall Products on July 15, 2003. Yordy refused this offer because she wanted to work the second shift and the job was for the first shift. JDM gave her several other job offers which she also declined because of her desire to work second shift.

DECISION: The circuit court reversed the Board’s decision, which had found the claimant was not disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under Section 29(1)(e).

RATIONALE: The purpose of the Act is to provide benefits to workers who are involuntarily unemployed. If the Board’s decision that Yordy was eligible for benefits were to stand, it would allow employees who were offered suitable work to turn it down and still receive benefits. Alternatively, the Board would have to preemptively decide what constitutes suitable work each time an employer offered a substitute job, which the legislature could not have intended.

Digest Author: Alisa Hand, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/1/2016

Categories
11. Leaving to Accept

Mullins v. Golden Home Health Care Agency – 10.108

Mullins v. Golden Home Health Care Agency
Digest No. 10.108

Section 421.29(1)(a)

Cite as: Mullins v Golden Home Health Care Agency, unpublished opinion of the Wayne County Circuit Court, issued May 27, 2005 (Docket No. 05-503476-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Shirley Mullins
Employer: Golden Home Health Care Agency
Date of decision: May 27, 2005

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HOLDING: A claimant who was employed in two part-time jobs concurrently and subsequently quit one in order to accept a full-time job with the other employer is not disqualified from receiving benefits if she subsequently loses her job with the other employer for a non-disqualifying reason.   

FACTS: Claimant was working two different jobs with Golden Home Health and Walmart, concurrently. Golden Home Health told her she would be given additional clients which would require her to take on additional travel without reimbursement. Additionally, Claimant learned of a full time opportunity with Walmart that would entail higher pay, benefits, and no travel. Claimant decided to leave her employment with Golden Home Health to pursue the full time opportunity with Walmart. After leaving this position, Claimant lost her full time job with Walmart and sought to collect unemployment benefits. Claimant was denied.

The ALJ found Claimant was not disqualified for benefits. The MCAC reversed and found Claimant disqualified for benefits.

DECISION: The Circuit Court reversed the decision of the MCAC. Claimant is not disqualified for benefits.

RATIONALE: Per Dickerson v Norrell Health Care, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Kent County Circuit Court, issued September 21, 1995 (Docket No. 95-1806-AE), a claimant who had simultaneous full-time and part-time employment, who left the part-time job for disqualifying reasons and later unexpectedly lost the full-time job for non-disqualifying reasons is not disqualified from receiving benefits under Section 29(1)(a) of the Act.

Since, when Claimant quit her job with Golden Home Healthcare, it only resulted in one less job, and not total unemployment, Claimant’s decision to quit her job with Golden Home Health was not disqualifying under Section 29(1)(a) of the Act.

Digest author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 10/31/2017

Categories
13. Refusal of Work

Dombeck v. Special Mold Engineering, Inc. – 13.26

Dombeck v. Special Mold Engineering, Inc.
Digest No. 13.26

Section 421.29(1)(e)

Cite as: Dombeck v Special Mold Engineering, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Maycomb County Circuit Court, issued April 14, 2005 (Docket No. 2005-000 1-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Max T. Dombeck
Employer: Special Mold Engineering, Inc.
Docket no.: 2005-000 1-AE
Date of decision: April 14, 2005

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HOLDING: When a claimant is offered the same position with identical pay, benefits, and work hours from an employer he previously worked for 7 months prior, after being laid off from his most recent employer, that offered position constitutes an offer of suitable employment. Further, not having adequate time to pursue alternate job options does not constitute good cause for refusal of suitable employment.

FACTS: Claimant was employed as a metal mold builder with Special Mold Engineering (SME). Claimant left SME to accept employment at another company because the new job provided day shift work, it was closer to home, it paid more money and would offer him opportunities for advancement. Claimant was laid off from employment on June 11, 2003 due to circumstances beyond his control. Claimant applied for unemployment benefits on June 12, 2003. On July 15, 2003, SME offered claimant his old job back, at the same rate of pay, with the same benefits, and with sufficient work hours. Claimant ultimately turned down the job offer because be felt “it was too soon for me to come back without being able to seek further employment with the, the new skill that I’ve learned.” Claimant was subsequently denied unemployment benefits under the refusal of suitable employment provision, MCL 421.29(1)(e)

DECISION: The MES Board’s decision was not contrary to the great weight of the evidence, finding that claimant was disqualified for unemployment benefits under MCL 421.29(1)(e).

RATIONALE: Claimant was offered suitable employment: a full-time job for which he was qualified at the same rate of pay he had been earning when he had left employment some 7 months prior, vacation pay and health benefits. Further, good cause for refusing to accept the offer of employment has not deem demonstrated. Although claimant stated he had not had enough time to find other employment, there is nothing to say that he could not have sought other employment while being employed. Claimant expressed some doubt about SME’s stability insofar as it had laid off some 20 employees and had cut hours shortly before he quit, but it is reasonable to assume that because they wanted to rehire him in July, the economic climate had changed for the better for SME, whereas, the new company had to lay off claimant due to an economic downturn, and there was no guarantee that claimant would be rehired.

Digest Author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016

Categories
12. Misconduct

Hoag v. Emro Marketing – 12.141

Hoag v. Emro Marketing
Digest No. 12.141

Section 421.29(1)(b)

Cite as: Hoag v Emro Mktg, unpublished opinion of the Maycomb County Circuit Court, issued April 9, 1999 (Docket No. 98-4783-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Jeffery A. Hoag
Employer: Emro Marketing
Docket no.: 98-4783-AE
Date of decision: April 9, 1999

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HOLDING: Recurrences of negligent behavior do not per se suggest an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests and thus cannot per se establish misconduct.

FACTS: Appellant worked as an assistant manager for Emro Marketing and was discharged for cash drawer shortages. Appellant was initially determined to be not disqualified from receiving benefits. A further redetermination also found Appellant not disqualified. A hearing in front of an ALJ held the same

finding that the employer had not met its burden of proof in establishing appellant was discharged for reasons which would constitute misconduct. Further, the ALJ found that the appellant’s reporting of the shortages which allocated the blame to himself,  coupled with his signing of the respective warnings from his employer did not constitute misconduct. The Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, on appeal, found that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case. The Board concluded that if appellant did not commit theft, then he was obviously negligent. Further, the Board found misconduct was established by such reoccurrences as to show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interests or of the employee’ s duties and obligations to the employer

DECISION: The Court finds the Board acted contrary to law when it determined appellant’s recurrent negligence rose to the level of disqualifying misconduct.

RATIONALE: The court found that the Board’s decision was contrary to law in that the facts found did not constitute the legal definition of misconduct. This is because the Board’s use of res ipsa loquitur was in error. When determining if misconduct exists,  the legal question is not merely whether appellant was negligent, but whether that negligence rises to the level of disqualifying misconduct. Negligent recurrences do not per se suggest an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s interests, thus, they do not amount to misconduct. Here the employer bears the burden of proof in showing appellant’s recurrent negligence showed an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest.

Digest Author: Cydney Warburton, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 3/1/2016

Categories
15. Labor Disputes

Baggett v. Riverside Osteopathic Hospital – 15.37

Baggett v. Riverside Osteopathic Hospital
Digest No. 15.37

Section 421.29(8)(a)(i)

Cite as: Baggett v Riverside Osteopathic Hospital, unpublished opinion of the Wayne County Circuit Court, issued February 19, 1999 (Docket No. 98-820404-AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Shelby Baggett, et al.
Employer
: Riverside Osteopathic Hospital
Docket no.: 98-820404-AE
Date of decision: February 19, 1999

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HOLDING: Claimants who were on strike had not been “permanently displaced,” and therefore a labor dispute was the cause of their unemployment, which disqualified claimants for benefits under Section 29(8)(a)(i) of the MES Act.

FACTS: Claimants went on strike May 24, 1990 and returned to work on October 19, 1990. After July 8, 1990, the employer began hiring employees who subsequently became “permanent” employees. From the date the strike began to the end of the strike, positions for the striking employees were available upon their return. Claimants were returned to their positions after the strike. During the strike, claimants applied for unemployment benefits. The Board of Review determined claimants disqualified for benefits.

DECISION: The circuit court affirmed the Board of Review’s decision, which found the claimant to be disqualified for benefits due under Section 29(8)(a)(i) of the MES Act.

RATIONALE: Section 29(8) of the MES Act reads in relevant part: “(a) An individual is disqualified from receiving benefits for a week in which the individual’s total or partial unemployment is due to either of the following: (i) A labor dispute in active progress at the place at which the individual is or was last employed, or a shutdown or start-up operation caused by that labor dispute.” The circuit court read the Michigan Supreme Court case of Plymouth Stamping v Lipshu, 436 Mich 1 (1990), to suggest that Section 29(8) means, “If there is a position open for a striking worker, he/she is ineligible for unemployment benefits.” But, if claimants were permanently displaced then the labor dispute would no longer be the cause of their unemployment, and the claimants would thus be eligible for benefits. Here, the circuit court determined that the striking employees had permanent positions to return to and and that those employees were, in fact, returned to those positions at the end of the strike. Further, these positions were available to claimants throughout the strike. Thus, the Board of Review’s conclusion that claimants were not permanently displaced was supported by substantial evidence.

Digest Author: Adam Kleven, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest Updated: 3/27/2016

Categories
12. Misconduct

Ellison v. MESC – 12.138

Ellison v. MESC
Digest No. 12.138

Section 421.29

Cite as: In the matter of the claim of Ellison, unpublished opinion of the MESC, issued June 6, 1972 (Docket No. B71-1229-40927).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Thomas H. Ellison
Employer: Michigan Employment Security Commission
Docket no.: B71-1229-40927
Date of decision: June 6, 1972

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HOLDING: An indefinite suspension of a Claimant is equivalent to a discharge. Claimant’s disqualification for benefits should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred.

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision issued on May 1, 1972. Claimant originally appealed a February 23, 1972 holding that Claimant should be disqualified from benefits under Section 29(9) of the Act for the period from December 15, 1971 through December 31, 1971; disqualified from benefits under Section 29(1)(b) of the Act for the week ending on January 1, 1972; and subject to requalification under Section 29(3) of the Act.

DECISION: The Appeal Board affirms the February 23, 1972 holding, except the part of the decision that relates to the disqualification under Section 29(9), as well as the dates of separation and discharge. The Appeal Board modifies the decision to establish that Claimant was given an indefinite suspension for misconduct either directly or indirectly connected with the work, and then discharged on December 31, 1970. Claimant was discharged following his last day of work on December 15, 1970 and is disqualified for benefits for the week ending in December 18, 1970.

RATIONALE: When an individual is given an indefinite suspension, it is tantamount to a discharge, and the disqualification should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred. The disqualification will continue until the individual requalifies as provided under Section 29(3) of the Act.

Digest Author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 1/7/2016