Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Hayman v S & H Travel Awards – 4.13

Hayman v S & H Travel Awards
Digest no. 4.13

Section 48

Cite as: Hayman v S & H Travel Awards, unpublished opinion of the Oakland Circuit Court, issued May 4, 1976 (Docket No. 75 126038).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Judith Hayman
Employer: S & H Travel Awards
Docket no.: B74 11222 46917
Date of decision: May 4, 1976

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: Where an employer customarily asks its employees to leave on their dates of termination, and pays them “severance pay” determined by each person’s salary and seniority, the additional money is not payment in lieu of notice.

FACTS: The Referee stated: “On the date of her dismissal, the claimant received three weeks of vacation and five weeks additional pay which has been considered by the employer to be payment in lieu of notice.”

DECISION: The additional pay is not remuneration under the Act.

RATIONALE: The Court adopted the decision of the Referee, who held: “The testimony indicated that, because of the risk of former employees providing the names of prospective customers to competitors, whenever an employee’s services were no longer needed, they were asked to leave employment on the same date that they were terminated. That is, employees were not given a certain time period as a notice of their termination during which they could seek other work. This being the case, the Referee does not find that the payment of five weeks of wages given to the claimant on her last day of employment could be considered payment in lieu of notice. The only time payment in lieu of notice could be given to an employee would be on occasions when it would be possible for notice to be given.” “In addition, it appears from the testimony that the claimant was advised that the payment she would be receiving would be in the nature of a severance payment.” “It also appears that the amount of the severance pay increased the longer an employee was employed by the company and the greater his or her, salary.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
12. Misconduct

Ellison v. MESC – 12.138

Ellison v. MESC
Digest No. 12.138

Section 421.29

Cite as: In the matter of the claim of Ellison, unpublished opinion of the MESC, issued June 6, 1972 (Docket No. B71-1229-40927).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Thomas H. Ellison
Employer: Michigan Employment Security Commission
Docket no.: B71-1229-40927
Date of decision: June 6, 1972

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HOLDING: An indefinite suspension of a Claimant is equivalent to a discharge. Claimant’s disqualification for benefits should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred.

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision issued on May 1, 1972. Claimant originally appealed a February 23, 1972 holding that Claimant should be disqualified from benefits under Section 29(9) of the Act for the period from December 15, 1971 through December 31, 1971; disqualified from benefits under Section 29(1)(b) of the Act for the week ending on January 1, 1972; and subject to requalification under Section 29(3) of the Act.

DECISION: The Appeal Board affirms the February 23, 1972 holding, except the part of the decision that relates to the disqualification under Section 29(9), as well as the dates of separation and discharge. The Appeal Board modifies the decision to establish that Claimant was given an indefinite suspension for misconduct either directly or indirectly connected with the work, and then discharged on December 31, 1970. Claimant was discharged following his last day of work on December 15, 1970 and is disqualified for benefits for the week ending in December 18, 1970.

RATIONALE: When an individual is given an indefinite suspension, it is tantamount to a discharge, and the disqualification should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred. The disqualification will continue until the individual requalifies as provided under Section 29(3) of the Act.

Digest Author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 1/7/2016