07. Eligibility - Able & Available

Silverstein v Chrysler Corp – 7.20

Silverstein v Chrysler Corp
Digest no. 7.20

Section 28(1)(c)

Cite as: Silverstein v Chrysler Corp, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Employment Security Board of Review, issued November 19, 1979 (No. B78 04755 61400).

Appeal Pending:No
Claimant: Myer M. Silverstein
Employer: Chrysler Corporation
Docket no.: B78 04755 61400
Date of decision: November 19, 1979

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BOARD OF REVIEW HOLDING:Where an individual’s prior employment involved substantial overtime, and the claimant has requalified for benefits after a disqualifying separation, the claimant’s availability can no longer be limited to work which would provide at least as much in annual earnings as the preceding job did.

FACTS: “Here, the claimant testified that he was earning approximately $20,000 per year at Chrysler Corporation prior to his retirement. He added that he was available for employment that paid a similar wage (T, p. 13). A review of the record indicates that claimant did earn wages at a weekly rate that would amount to $20,000 annually (Exhibit No. 2). The claimant earned $7.69 per hour, therefore, it appears that he was including over-time pay in his wage total.”

DECISION:The claimant is not eligible for benefits subsequent to the requalification period.

RATIONALE:“Surely the claimant here should not be penalized because he initially expected to find employment at a wage comparable to that which he most recently earned. However, in light of the fact that his wage requirements were somewhat inflated due to the inclusion of over-time pay, and the fact that at some point his wage demands became excessive, we must find that he was required to lower his ‘sights’ after a reasonable period of time. We find that during the period of requalification, it was not unreasonable that the claimant expected to find employment at his previous rate. However, after requalifying and then being qualified to collect unemployment benefits, he was required to ‘lower his sights’ and accept a lower wage. By applying this ‘rule of reason,’ the majority of the Board panel is of the opinion that the claimant was given ample time to test the waters of the market and obtain employment at his previous rate during his requalification period.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:11/90

12. Misconduct

Ellison v. MESC – 12.138

Ellison v. MESC
Digest No. 12.138

Section 421.29

Cite as: In the matter of the claim of Ellison, unpublished opinion of the MESC, issued June 6, 1972 (Docket No. B71-1229-40927).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Thomas H. Ellison
Employer: Michigan Employment Security Commission
Docket no.: B71-1229-40927
Date of decision: June 6, 1972

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HOLDING: An indefinite suspension of a Claimant is equivalent to a discharge. Claimant’s disqualification for benefits should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred.

FACTS: This is an appeal from a decision issued on May 1, 1972. Claimant originally appealed a February 23, 1972 holding that Claimant should be disqualified from benefits under Section 29(9) of the Act for the period from December 15, 1971 through December 31, 1971; disqualified from benefits under Section 29(1)(b) of the Act for the week ending on January 1, 1972; and subject to requalification under Section 29(3) of the Act.

DECISION: The Appeal Board affirms the February 23, 1972 holding, except the part of the decision that relates to the disqualification under Section 29(9), as well as the dates of separation and discharge. The Appeal Board modifies the decision to establish that Claimant was given an indefinite suspension for misconduct either directly or indirectly connected with the work, and then discharged on December 31, 1970. Claimant was discharged following his last day of work on December 15, 1970 and is disqualified for benefits for the week ending in December 18, 1970.

RATIONALE: When an individual is given an indefinite suspension, it is tantamount to a discharge, and the disqualification should begin with the week in which the act or discharge which caused the disqualification occurred. The disqualification will continue until the individual requalifies as provided under Section 29(3) of the Act.

Digest Author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest Updated: 1/7/2016