Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Weideman v Interlakes Engineering Co – 4.07

Weideman v Interlakes Engineering Co
Digest no. 4.07

Section 48

Cite as: Weideman v Interlakes Engineering Co, unpublished opinion of the Macomb Circuit Court, issued November 28, 1975 (Docket No. 744941 AE).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: William Weideman, et al.
Employer: Interlakes Engineering Company
Docket no.: B73 3107 43951, et al.
Date of decision: November 28, 1975

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CIRCUIT COURT HOLDING: Back pay received as the result of an N.L.R.B. settlement agreement is remuneration under Section 48 of the Act, even where the amount is less than the claimed loss of wages.

FACTS: The claimants received $10,000.00 under a settlement agreement approved by the National Labor Relations Board. The claimants alleged their total wage loss was $26,000.00. “It is claimed that the Appellants assumed that the actual compensation for loss of wages was covered by their unemployment benefits from the MESC and that the $10,000.00 settlement was remuneration for loss of fringe benefits.”

DECISION: The back pay is remuneration under the Act.

RATIONALE: The Court quoted the text of the settlement agreement:

Paragraph 7 referred to states that the employer shall ‘Make whole the below-named employees for any loss of pay they may have suffered by payment of a lump sum settlement of $10,000.00 …’ From the terms of the agreement it is clear that the stipulation and the order indicate that the lump sum settlement was a back pay award. Appellants claim that the stipulation is silent as to back pay. In addition this Court notes that the National Labor Relations Board has no authority to pay a discriminatee damages for anything other than lost wages.

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp – 4.01

Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp
Digest no. 4.01

Section 48

Cite as: Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp, 394 Mich 702 (1975).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Russell W. Brown, et al.
Employer: LTV Aerospace Corporation
Docket no.: B70 773 38400
Date of decision: September 8, 1975

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: (1) A pro-rata vacation allowance at the time of layoff is not a termination allowance and may be considered as vacation pay. (2) Where claimants are not numerous enough to require a class action, and their consolidated appeal is filed in a circuit other than Ingham, the appeal must be dismissed as to any claimant not residing in the circuit of filing.

FACTS: At the time of layoff, the claimants were paid a pro-rata share of their annual vacation pay. These payments were held to be remuneration under Section 48 of the Act. The claimants appealed to Macomb Circuit Court, where the appeal was dismissed as to claimant Boyer because he resided in Oakland County.

DECISION: (1) The pro-rata vacation pay was remuneration. (2) Boyer’s appeal was properly dismissed.

RATIONALE: (1) Analysis of the union contract ” … indicates that the agreement speaks of vacation pay to an employee regularly employed, of one ‘at the time of termination’ and one ‘terminated for lack of work and subsequently recalled’ in exactly the same way. The emphasis is all on guaranteeing vacation pay in accord with credit earned because of time worked. The system is integral and it is no different ‘at time of separation’ from either regular annual anniversary payments or payments of allowances for those terminated and then recalled.”

“The language of the statute is unambiguous, and it is clear that under [Section] 38 Boyer should have filed his appeal in either Oakland Circuit Court, the circuit court of the county in which he resided, or the Ingham Circuit Court.

Section 38 is a statutory grant of jurisdiction to certain circuit courts; if an appeal is improperly filed in the wrong court, that court has no option but to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Hickson v Chrysler Corp – 4.02

Hickson v Chrysler Corp
Digest no. 4.02

Section 48

Cite as: Hickson v Chrysler Corp, 394 Mich 724 (1975).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Joseph R. Hickson
Employer: Chrysler Corporation
Docket no.: B70 5047 RO 39184
Date of decision: September 8, 1975

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: Where a labor agreement provides for the allocation of vacation pay to a portion of an indefinite layoff period, the payments are remuneration and not severance pay.

FACTS: “Soon after being laid off plaintiff received 28 days vacation pay from his employer in accordance with a Chrysler-UAW contract. The 28 days pay was comprised of:

1) 17-1/2 days vacation credit accrued in 1969 which prior to the layoff plaintiff and his employer had agreed the plaintiff would take between July 6 and July 29 and

2) 10-1/2 vacation days accrued in 1970 up to the time of the layoff which normally would not have been taken until 1971.”

DECISION: The claimant’s vacation pay constitutes remuneration under Section 48 of the Act.

RATIONALE: “In this case there can be no question that the Chrysler/UAW contract provided for the designation of the period for allocation of vacation pay.”

“Receipt of ‘termination, separation, severance, or dismissal allowances, and bonuses’ suggests payment independent of and perhaps in addition to vacation payments. The payments in question were clearly ‘for a vacation or a holiday.'”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

MESC v Vulcan Forging Co – 4.22

MESC v Vulcan Forging Co
Digest no. 4.22

Section 48

Cite as: MESC v Vulcan Forging Co, 375 Mich 374 (1965).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Henry Czarnata
Employer: Vulcan Forging Company
Docket no.: B58 2338 21038
Date of decision: May 10, 1965

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: Claimants who were on unpaid vacation pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement were unemployed according to the Act for those weeks with respect to which they performed no services and received no remuneration.

FACTS: The plant where claimants worked was shut for vacation in accordance with a collective bargaining agreement but the instant claimants received no vacation pay because they had insufficient senority.

DECISION: The claimants were unemployed for purposes of the Act.

RATIONALE: The court expressly overruled IM Dach Underwear Co v ESC, 347 Mich 465 (1956). The court concluded that claimants’ unpaid vacation status was not equivalent to a “leave of absence” because a leave of absence “signifies an authorized temporary absence from work for other than vacation purposes.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
12/91

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Renown Stove Co v UCC – 4.21

Renown Stove Co v UCC
Digest no. 4.21

Section 48

Cite as: Renown Stove Co v UCC, 328 Mich 436 (1950).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: George Sheldon, et al.
Employer: Renown Stove Company
Docket no.: B8 5900 1 9580
Date of decision: September 11, 1950

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MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT HOLDING: Where the option to receive vacation with pay or payment in lieu of vacation rests with the employee, a payment received during a period of unemployment will be deemed a bonus rather than vacation pay.

FACTS: One group of employees worked under a contract which provided for vacation pay and specified the vacation period from July 5 to July 18, 1948. There was no option for payment in lieu of vacation. The second group’s contract also provided for vacation pay but their vacation period was not specified and these claimants had the right to receive pay in lieu of vacation. Both groups of employees were laid off for lack of work in April, 1948 and filed for and began receiving unemployment benefits. On June 28, 1948, they received checks equal to either 1 or 2 weeks of wages. The employer contested the payment of benefits for the period following July 5, 1948 asserting that the workers had vacation pay for the same period.

DECISION: The claimants covered by the first agreement received vacation pay and are not entitled to receive unemployment benefits for the same period. Those covered by the second agreement received a bonus and not vacation pay and are entitled to receive benefits with respect to the period beginning July 5 during which they did not work.

RATIONALE: The controlling question is whether the employer paid the employees for or with respect to the 1 or 2 week period beginning July 5. The first agreement specified that the period from July 5 to July 18 was a vacation period and those claimants were not entitled to the June 28 payment for any other reason. But, the claimants who worked under the second agreement had the option to take a vacation with pay or work, and in addition to wages for such work, receive a bonus in lieu of the vacation with pay. Since the option rested with the employees, the June 28 payment was a bonus and not vacation pay.

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
12/91

Categories
04. Total or Partial Unemployment

Phillips v UCC – 4.04

Phillips v UCC
Digest no. 4.04

Section 48

Cite as: Phillips v UCC, 323 Mich 188 (1948).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Pleasant I. Phillips
Employer: Winters and Crampton Corporation
Docket no.: B7 15029 8250
Date of decision: December 17, 1948

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SUPREME COURT HOLDING: (1) The claimant has the burden of proof as to eligibility. (2) An attorney who practices law 8 to 12 hours per day is not unemployed. (3) Compensation earned, not compensation received, is the test of remuneration.

FACTS: The claimant, an attorney, began practicing law in 1900.He performed factory work ” … from August 12, 1944, until October 6, 1947, when he was laid off due to lack of work. He continued in the practice of law, maintaining a law office in which he spent from 8 to 12 hours per day.” The receipts from the law office were $31.00 in the 7 weeks following the claimant’s layoff.

DECISION: The claimant is not unemployed.

RATIONALE: “We believe that the words ‘unemployed individual’ are used in [Section] 28 in their ordinarily accepted sense and that, taken in that light, one who is engaged in rendering service for remuneration or who devotes his time to the practice of a profession by which a living is customarily earned cannot be said to be unemployed.”

“Remuneration earned, not remuneration received, is the test under this section. Efforts expended in those weeks may well have earned fees paid at a subsequent date, a thing not at all unusual in a law practice.”

“The burden was on plaintiff to prove his eligibility under [Section] 48. Dwyer v Unemployment Compensation Commission, 321 Mich 178. From the record it does not appear that he sustained that burden.”

Digest Author: Board of Review (original digest here)
Digest Updated:
11/90