Categories
12. Misconduct

Mendoza v. Aerotek, Inc. – 12.159

Mendoza v. Aerotek, Inc.
Digest No. 12.159

Section 421.29(1)(m)

Cite as: Mendoza v Aerotek, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission, issued August 18, 2017 (Docket No. 17-004211-252718W).

Court: Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission
Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Pedro Mendoza
Employer: Aerotek Incorporated
Date of decision: August 18, 2017

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) reversed an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) order finding Claimant disqualified for benefits under the “testing positive for drug use” provision of Section 29(1)(m).  The Commission held that under Ashford v Unemployment Compensation Commission, 328 Mich 428, 433 (1950), the employer did not meet its burden of proof where it failed to appear, and thus no prima facie case was established to prove the misconduct.  Therefore, the Commission reversed the order and found Claimant eligible for benefits.

FACTS:  The Agency found Claimant disqualified for benefits under the misconduct provision of MES 421.29.  Here, Claimant tested positive for drug use on an employer-administered drug test and thus was found ineligible under the illicit drug use provision of Section 29(1)(m).  At the hearing, the only participants present were Claimant’s attorneys and the judge.  Despite the employer’s lack of appearance, the judge affirmed the Agency’s finding of disqualification and held Claimant ineligible for benefits.  The MCAC reversed on appeal.

DECISION: The Commission reversed the ALJ order and found Claimant not disqualified for benefits under Section 29(1)(m).

RATIONALE: The Commission found that because the employer had the burden of proof to establish misconduct, its failure to appear at Claimant’s hearing and present evidence to support a finding of misconduct failed to meet the burden of proof.  Because no prima facie showing of misconduct could be established without the employer’s presence, the Commission held that the ALJ erred in affirming the Agency’s finding of misconduct.  Further, Claimant had no burden of proof in this case, and had only the obligation to prosecute his appeal under Ashford.  Because the employer failed to meet its burden of proof by not appearing at the hearing, and because Claimant had no burden of proof under Section 29(1)(m), the order was reversed and the Commission found Claimant not disqualified for benefits.

Digest author: Laura Page, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest updated: January 2, 2018

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Saylor v. C.L. Rieckhoff Co. – 16.95

Saylor v. C.L. Rieckhoff Co.
Digest No. 16.95

Section 421.62

Cite as: Saylor v C L Rieckhoff Co, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission, issued August 2, 2017 (Docket No. 16-029832-252337W).

Court: Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission
Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Brian Saylor
Employer: C.L. Rieckhoff Co.
Date of decision: August 2, 2017

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HOLDING: The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission held that the Agency must have an employer protest and a determination of eligibility before it can initiate a fraud investigation. Further, the Commission held that a benefit check determination of eligibility under 32(f) is not a sufficient predicate determination to issue a 62(a) fraud determination.

FACTS: Claimant had received benefits and the Agency issued him redeterminations accusing him of committing fraud. He was required to repay the amount received in benefits plus penalty. The Agency did not receive an employer protest, but rather issued the redetermination on its own motion.

The Agency argued that the benefit check determinations under 32(f) of the Act were sufficient to allow it to issue redeterminations. The Commission disagreed.

DECISION: The Commission’s decision rested on procedural due process. It decided that the method employed by the Agency in issuing the redetermination violated Claimant’s due process rights.

RATIONALE: The Commission’s decision stemmed from both a statutory construction of the MESA, due process, and the Michigan Administrative Procedures Act. The Commission found that 32(f) did not provide the basis for redeterminations finding fraud; rather, a separate determination of ineligibility needed to occur before a 62(a) redetermination of fraud could be found. Further, because there was no initial determination to serve as the foundation for the redetermination, the issuance of the redeterminations were procedurally deficient. The Commission reasoned that the MAPA required it to set aside the redeterminations regardless of whether Claimant timely appealed, as they were issued erroneously.

The Commission further noted that the Agency did not have the ability to issue redeterminations without an employer protest outside of the time frame prescribed by section 32a of the Act.

Digest author: Travis R. Miller, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest updated: January 2, 2018

Categories
20. Miscellaneous

Bauserman v Unemployment Insurance Agency – 20.09

Bauserman v Unemployment Insurance Agency
Digest No. 20.09

MCL 600.6431

Cite as: Bauserman v Unemployment Insurance Agency, unpublished decision of the Court of Claims, entered May 10, 2016 (Case No. 15-000202-MM).

Bauserman v Unemployment Insurance Agency, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued July 18, 2017 (Docket No. 333181).

Court: Court of Claims and Court of Appeals
Appeal pending: Yes
Claimant: Bauserman
Employer: N/A
Date of decision: May 10, 2016; July 18, 2017

View/download the full Court of Claims decision

View/download the full Court of Appeals decision

View/download the full complaint

HOLDING: The Court of Claims held that the Agency’s motion to dismiss was denied because plaintiffs complied with the notice provisions of MCL 600.6431, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs’ claims are not barred by governmental immunity.

The Court of Appeals reversed the Court of Claims holding. The case was remanded for entry of an order granting summary judgment for the Agency

The matter is currently under review by the Michigan Supreme Court.

FACTS: Named plaintiff was terminated from his employment and applied for unemployment benefits. He received benefits for a over a year. While he was receiving benefits, he received from his former employer a lump sum deferred payment of his pro rated bonus from the previous year, which he earned prior to his termination. MIDAS detected a discrepancy and concluded that plaintiff received benefits while he was earning income.

The UIA sent a request for information relative to ineligibility or disqualification to plaintiff’s online MiWAM account, however he was not checking the account as he was no longer receiving benefits at the time. When he finally saw the message months later, he began writing to the Agency to explain the lump sum. The Agency never responded.

Eventually, they notified plaintiff that he had been overpaid benefits and would be assessed a penalty. Plaintiff again contacted the Agency explaining the bonus. Then the United States Department of Treasury notified plaintiff that his federal income tax refund had been seized by the State of Michigan to collect on his unemployment debt. Similar action was taken by the State of Michigan Treasury.

Finally, Plaintiff received a redetermination that its earlier fraud determination was null and void. Plaintiff had filed a complaint in the Court of Claims alleging that the Agency’s fraud detection program, and its collection and seizure of assets, violated the due process clause of the Michigan Const 1963, Art 1, § 17.

DECISION: The Court of Claims decided that plaintiffs’ causes of action did not accrue when Agency first notified them of their liability for unemployment but rather when the Agency issued a redetermination which concluded that the plaintiff had not received UIA benefits fraudulently. The administrative process fails to afford sufficient relief to plaintiff’s challenging an entire statute and policy, therefore a constitutional court claim is viable and there is no governmental immunity.  The Agency’s motion to dismiss on lack of standing is denied.

The Court of Appeals decided that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when “the wrong on which they base their claim was done.” The Court decided the garnishment of wages and interception of tax returns was not the initial event given rise to their claim. Rather, when the Agency issued notices of its determinations and the plaintiffs were not given requisite notice or opportunity to be heard was the initial wrong.

RATIONALE: The Court of Claims found that the plaintiffs’ causes of action did not accrue when the Agency first notified them of their liability for unemployment benefits and penalties, but much later. The causes of action accrued when the Agency issued a redetermination that concluded that plaintiffs had not received UIA benefits fraudulently. At the time the Agency issued the redetermination, then plaintiffs could fully allege the elements of the claim. The amended complaint was filed within six months of the redetermination dates, therefore the plaintiffs complied with statutory requirements.

Furthermore, the Court found that the administrative process by which the plaintiffs could appeal within the Agency failed to afford sufficient relief to plaintiffs wishing to challenge the entire statutory and policy scheme. Therefore the Court found no governmental immunity existed in this case.

The Court of Appeals found that the forfeiture of monetary assets was the damage resulting from the wrongful conduct of the Agency and therefore did not rise to the event given cause for a claim. The Court said this is consistent with the Michigan Supreme Court’s recent decision in Frank v Linkner, 894 NW2d 574 (2017) where the court held that the plaintiffs’ argument “conflates monetary damages with harm.” Frank involved a shareholder oppression action not an unemployment benefits action.

Since the parties did not dispute the date of named plaintiff’s notices of redetermination were December 3, 2014, the action filed on September 9, 2015 is well beyond the six months following the event that gave rise to the cause of action.

Digest author: Sara Posner, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: December 5, 2017

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Lawrence v Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency – 16.96

Lawrence v Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency
Digest No. 16.96

Section 421.33

Cite as: Lawrence v Mich Unemployment Ins Agency, 320 Mich App 422 (2017).

Court: Court of Appeals
Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Suzanne Lawrence
Employer: Bloomfield Hills Country Club
Docket No.: 332398
Date of decision: July 11, 2017

View/download the full decision

COURT OF APPEALS HOLDING: The claimant does not have the burden to prove that she did not receive benefit checks.

FACTS: Claimant worked for a country club and was laid off for the winter season. Claimant  was paid vacation time for the first weeks of the lay off. The Agency alleged that Claimant received benefits during those weeks and is required to pay restitution ($158). Claimant denied receiving benefits during those weeks. Claimant appealed the lower decisions as misconstruing the case: the lower decisions referred to eligibility, but Claimant argued that the case is about whether she received any payment during the ineligible weeks.

DECISION: Reversed. The courts focused on the wrong issue: it was not whether Claimant was eligible but rather whether she received payment on the ineligible weeks; and there was error in affirming MCAC and in its factual determinations, misapplying the substantial evidence test.

RATIONALE: The ALJ “bewilderingly” focused consideration on eligibility during the weeks Claimant “conceded she was ineligible.” (Emphasis in original.) The ALJ decision lacks legal grounds because eligibility was not at issue. MCAC “completely missed the mark” by not overturning because the issue on appeal was whether the ALJ addressed the appropriate issue.

The circuit court erred when when it determined that MCAC’s decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. The notices of restitution and the determination were “not proof that the MUIA issued an overpayment, in any amount, to [Claimant], and to accept them as such would defy common sense.” Without a scintilla of evidence to support the payments, the circuit court erred by affirming MCAC’s decision as supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. Claimant did not have the burden to establish that she did not receive benefits as alleged. Claimant would need to rebut evidence by the Agency, but it is not her burden in the first instance. This avoids Hodge because the circuit court did not need to substitute its judgment on credibility for the ALJ’s; the ALJ simply did not make a contrary factual finding.

Digest author: Benjamin Tigay, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest updated: January 2, 2018

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Cotton v. Express Employment Professionals – 16.93

Cotton v. Express Employment Professionals
Digest No. 16.93

Section 421.62

Cite as: Cotton v Express Employment Professionals, unpublished opinion of the Maycomb County Circuit Court, issued June 5, 2017 (Docket No. 2016 -4047-AE).

Court: Macomb County Circuit Court
Appeal pending: Yes
Claimant: Yvette Cotton
Employer: Express Employment Professionals
Date of decision: June 5, 2017

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: The court found that the Agency lacked jurisdiction to issue a redetermination of the claimant’s “benefit check determinations” under 32a(2), which holds that the Agency must have good cause to reconsider a prior determination or redetermination after the 30-day period has expired and must re-open within a year of the previous determination. The court therefore found it unnecessary to address the timeliness of the claimant’s subsequent protests.

FACTS: Claimant had received benefits and the Agency issued her redeterminations accusing her of committing fraud. She was required to repay the amount received in benefits plus penalty. The Agency did not receive a timely employer protest, and the employer did not show good cause for issuing a late protest.

The Agency argued that the benefit check determinations under 32(f) of the Act were sufficient to allow it to issue redeterminations. The Court disagreed.

DECISION: The Court’s decision rested on procedural due process. It decided that the method employed by the Agency in issuing the redetermination violated claimant’s due process rights. The court remanded for further proceedings to determine the basis for the determinations, but noted it did not need to reach Claimant’s good cause for late appeal, as the redeterminations were issued erroneously.

RATIONALE: The court’s decision stemmed from both a statutory construction of the MESA and due process. The court demurred the Agency’s contention that section 62 of the Act gave it authority to issue determinations and redeterminations. Rather, the court reasoned, MESA gives the Agency authority under 32a. This means that the Agency does not have broad, sweeping authority, over the course of three years, to make determinations and redeterminations. They must do so within the parameters of 32a and 32.

The court made clear that the deficiencies in the Agency’s process meant the court did not need to address Claimant’s good cause for reopening.

Digest author: Travis R. Miller, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest updated: January 2, 2018

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Sanderson v. UIA – 16.94

Sanderson v. UIA
Digest No. 16.94

Section 421.32a & Section 421.62

Cite as: Sanderson v Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency, unpublished decision of the Court of Claims, issued June 5, 2017 (Case No. 16-000083-MM).

Court: Court of Claims
Appeal pending: Yes
Plaintiff: Judy Sanderson, Albert Morris, Antonyal Louis, and Madeline Browne
Defendant: Unemployment Insurance Agency
Date of decision: June 5, 2017

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: The Court granted the defendant’s motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to satisfy the requirements of MCL 600.6431.

FACTS: Claimant Sanderson began receiving unemployment benefits in June 2009. The UIA issued redeterminations on September 26, 27, and 28, 2011 determining that Claimant was not entitled to benefits because she made intentional misrepresentations. The UIA gives three years from the date of the last redetermination to initiate administrative action or court action to recover improperly paid benefits. The UIA began collection efforts against Claimant in May 2014. Interception of her tax refund occurred on or about April 9, 2015.

DECISION: Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements found in MCL 600.6431. Claimant Sanderson’s complaint was filed on April 11, 2016, far more than six months after the first instance of wrongful garnishment.

The Court denied the plaintiffs’ request to amend the complaint and rejects the claim that summary disposition is premature because discovery has not yet begun.

RATIONALE: Plaintiffs’ claims do no meet the timing requirements of MCL 600.6431. This applies a six month notice deadline to file a complaint. The Court assumed without deciding that Plaintiffs’ interpretation of Section 421.62 is correct, which sets a three year period for collecting a debt. However, plaintiffs’ complaints were filed on April 11, 2016 and in order for them to satisfy the requirements under MCL 600.6431, the wrongs need to occur within six months of the filing date. None of the claims asserted fit the timeframe.

The Court denied leave to amend because there is no manner in which they could amend the complaint so that it complies with the requirements under MCL 600.6431.

The Court also determined that plaintiffs’ assertions were not enough to demonstrate that discovery is warranted in this matter.

Digest author: Sara Posner, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: December 26, 2017

Categories
19. Federal Court Decisions & TRA

Hicks v Colvin – 19.17

Hicks v Colvin
Digest No. 19.17

Due Process/Fraud

Cite as: Hicks v Colvin, 214 F Supp 3d 627 (ED KY 2016).

Court: District Court, Eastern District of Kentucky
Appeal pending: Yes
Claimant: Amy Jo Hicks
Agency: Social Security Administration
Date of decision: October 12, 2016

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: Due process requires individuals to be able to challenge factual assertions made by the government as part of the government redetermining their eligibility for benefits.

FACTS: Claimant, who suffered several psychological and physical ailments, applied for Social Security disability benefits in 2007 with the help of Attorney Eric Conn. Claimant received benefits until 2014, when the SSA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) discovered a fraudulent scheme orchestrated by Conn with the help of ALJ Daugherty and several doctors. The OIG ordered the SSA to redetermine 1,787 of Conn’s clients’ cases, hold new ALJ hearings, and disregard any evidence if there was reason to believe fraud was involved. At Claimant’s hearing the ALJ refused to review or admit her medical records because they were based on a template medical form that Conn used in his fraudulent scheme. Because so much time had passed, Claimant was unable to testify regarding her exact medical condition and diagnosis at the time she applied for benefits, so her benefits were cancelled.

DECISION: The OIG policy of ordering the SSA to automatically disregard evidence during the redetermination process if the OIG had reason to believe fraud was involved violated due process because it denied individuals a meaningful opportunity for a hearing at which they could challenge the OIG’s factual assertions of fraud.

RATIONALE: Due process requires the government to give individuals a “meaningful hearing” that will provide them with “a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 533; 124 S Ct 2633 (2004). That includes giving the individual the right to present facts and have their case be decided according to those facts. Interstate Commerce Comm’n v Nashville RR Co, 227 US 88, 91; 33 S Ct 185 (1913). The OIG’s policy violated due process because it allowed the SSA to make a factual determination about an individual–that they committed fraud–without explaining its reasons or allowing the individual to challenge the determination. Although the SSA did give Claimant a hearing, because it excluded all her medical evidence and didn’t give her the opportunity to challenge the OIG’s determination that the evidence was fraudulent, her hearing was not “meaningful.”

The Court declined to give the OIG fraud policy Chevron deference because it was a policy, not a rule that had undergone notice-and-comment, and thus lacked the force of law. The Court also explained, citing Loudermill v Cleveland Board of Ed, 470 US 532, 541; 105 S Ct 1487 (1985), that although social security disability is an entitlement, so long as the government operates the program, it cannot take away benefits without due process. The Court held the portion of the OIG fraud policy unconstitutional that required ALJs to disregard the evidence it labelled fraudulent without giving those ALJs deference as the fact-finder to determine whether or not it was fraudulent. The Court suggested that, on rehearing, Claimant should be able to offer whatever evidence she wanted, and allow the ALJ discretion to determine whether it was fraudulent or should be admitted.

Digest author: Sarah Harper, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: December 23, 2017

Categories
18. Restitution, Waiver, Fraud

Wickham v. Adecco CS, Inc. – 18.23

Wickham v. Adecco CS, Inc.
Digest No. 18.23

Section 421.32(a)

Cite as: Wickham v Adecco CS, Inc, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Administrative Hearing System, issued September 28, 2016 (Docket No. 16-021211).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Margaret M. Wickham
Employer: Adecco CS Inc.
Date of decision: September 28, 2016

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: Under Michigan law, when pleading a cause of action involving fraud, the circumstances alleged to must be stated with particularity. In addition, in a fraud case, due process of law is violated when a claimant is not apprised of when, why, or how her actions constitute intentional misrepresentation of material fact.

FACTS: Claimant received a November 21, 2014 adjudication that concludes that Claimant’s “actions” indicate that she intentionally misled and/or concealed information to obtain benefits to which she was not otherwise entitled.

DECISION: The November 21, 2014 adjudication is facially defective as a matter of law, so it is void, set aside, vacated, and dismissed. Therefore the Agency’s denial of reconsideration concerns an invalid underlying adjudication, so it must also be set aside, vacated, and dismissed as a matter of law.

RATIONALE: The November 21, 2014 adjudication includes no factual assertions in support of the vague generalized legal conclusion that Claimant’s “actions” indicate that she intentionally misled and/or concealed information to obtain benefits to which she was not otherwise entitled. The Agency’s omission of particularized factual assertions in support of its legal conclusions violates Michigan law concerning the pleading of causes of action including fraud. Kassab v Michigan Basic Property Insurance Association, 441 Mich 433 (1992) requires that, when pleading a cause of action involving fraud, the circumstances alleged to must be stated with particularity. Section 421.32(a) requires the Agency to examine claims and render determinations on the facts; the Unemployment Insurance Agency lacks jurisdiction to render adjudications containing summary legal conclusions unsupported by factual assertions. In addition, the November 21, 2014 adjudication violates the demands of due process of law by failing to apprise Claimant of when, why, and how her “actions” constitute intentional misrepresentation of material fact.

Digest author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: November 26, 2017

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

DiGregorio v J C Concrete Inc. – 16.92

DiGregorio v J C Concrete Inc.
Digest No. 16.92

Section 421.32a

Cite as: DiGregorio v J C Concrete Inc, unpublished decision of the Michigan Administrative Hearing System, issued September 8, 2016 (Case No. 15-060623).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Daniel DiGregorio
Employer: J C Concrete Inc.
Date of decision: September 8, 2016

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: Claimant had good cause for his late appeal because he could not understand the conflicting decisions of the Agency with his ADD. Restitution is cancelled because of deficient notice and the Agency’s failure to collect within the statutory period.

FACTS: On September 1, 2015, the Agency issued a redetermination seeking restitution. Claimant did not appeal this until October 29, 2015. Claimant received “over twenty” adjudications from the Agency and was confused because he felt they were conflicting. Claimant concluded that he did not owe anything, so he did not appeal. He did not appeal until he received a bill from the Agency. Claimant also alleges that his ADD and anxiety, for which he sees a doctor and takes medication, affected his ability to comprehend things.

DECISION: Claimant had good cause for the late appeal. Fraud penalties reversed and Claimant does not owe any restitution.

RATIONALE: On good cause, Claimant was confronted at once with many decisions with “conflicting results [that] would be confusing to all but the most seasoned claimant.” In light of this and Claimant’s comprehension limitations, he had good cause for the late appeal.

The Agency violated due process with its fraud redeterminations. Due process requires that the party has notice that is “reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them the opportunity to present their objections.” Brooks Williamson & Associates, Inc v Mayflower Const Co, 308 Mich App 18, 35; (2014) citing Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co  “A bare demand for payment of fraud penalties does not establish or give notice of the basis for the demand.”

As for restitution, the Agency issued the fraud claim after three years, so the claim for restitution is time barred under Section 62(a). Further, the Agency failed to issue a determination in this case, and a “redetermination without a determination is void as a matter of law.” Fisk v Prostaff Employment Solutions LLC, 15-057282-248256W and 15-057299-238257W MCAC (May 23, 2016).

Digest author: Benjamin Tigay, Michigan Law, Class of 2018
Digest updated: January 26, 2018

Categories
16. Procedures/Appeals

Knox v. Right At Home Southeastern MI Inc. – 16.90

Knox v. Right At Home Southeastern MI Inc.
Digest No. 16.90

Section 421.29; Section 421.32a; Section 421.62; Section 421.33

Cite as: Knox v Right At Home Southeastern MI Inc, unpublished opinion of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission, issued July 29, 2016 (Docket No. 15-018792-247172W).

Appeal pending: No
Claimant: Teresa R. Knox
Employer: Right at Home Southeastern MI Inc.
Date of decision: July 29, 2016

View/download the full decision

HOLDING: Under Section 421.32a, the Agency cannot reconsider a prior determination or redetermination more than one year from the date of mailing or personal service of the original determination on the disputed issue. All adjudications issued by the Agency that are contrary to this rule are void and must be set aside. All ALJ decisions made after the Agency improperly transferred over a case due to a violation of Section 421.32a are to be set aside as well.

FACTS: In February 2012, the Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) issued a Notice of Determination holding the claimant disqualified from receipt of unemployment insurance benefits under Section 421.29(1)(a). In June 2014, more than two years after the February 2012 Determination was issued, the Agency, on its own motion, reconsidered the Determination and issued a June 25, 2014 Redetermination. A March 2015 Redetermination held the claimant disqualified from receipt of unemployment insurance benefits under the voluntary leaving provisions of Section 421.29(1)(a) and held the claimant subject to restitution under Section 421.62(a). A November 2015 ALJ decision affirmed the March 2015 Redetermination. The claimant timely appealed to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) from the November 2015 ALJ decision.

DECISION: The November 2015 ALJ decision is set aside. The June 25, 2014 Redetermination and all subsequent Agency adjudications are set aside. The February 2012 Determination is a final ruling on this matter. Therefore Claimant is disqualified from receipt of benefits but Claimant is not subject to restitution.

RATIONALE:

Section 421.32a(2) provides that the Agency may, for good cause, reconsider a prior determination or redetermination after the 30 day period has expired, but that a reconsideration shall not be made unless the request is filed with the UIA, or reconsideration is initiated by the UIA with notice to the interested parties, within one year from the date of mailing or personal service of the original determination on the disputed issue.

The Michigan Supreme Court held in Roman Cleanser v Murphy, 386 Mich 698 (1972) that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to an Agency ruling that has become “final” under Section 421.32a(2). As a result, the February 2012 Determination, which did not include any ruling on restitution under Section 421.62(a), is a final ruling. Therefore the June 25, 2014 Redetermination is void and must be set aside as the Agency had no legal authority to issue that ruling. All adjudications issued by the Agency after the June 25, 2014 Redetermination are void and must be set aside.

In addition, because the June 25, 2014 Redetermination was not in accordance with Section 421.32a, under Section 421.33 (“An appeal from a redetermination issued . . . in accordance with section 32a or a matter transferred for hearing and decision in accordance with section 32a shall be referred to the Michigan administrative hearing system for assignment to an administrative law judge”), the Agency was without authority to transfer the matter for hearing and assignment to an ALJ.

Digest author: Winne Chen, Michigan Law, Class of 2017
Digest updated: 10/31/2017